anti-communist crusades another.
The question then becomes, * under what conditions does this transference of ideology from the bureaucracy to its environment or groups within its environment take place? Howard S. Becker supplies one answer to this, suggesting that this is the work of a "moral entrepreneur", either in the role of a crusading reformer or a rule enforcer. 3
In either role, the moral entrepreneur as an individual takes the initiative and generates a "moral enterprise." This explanation has appeal. It is reminiscent of Weber's charismatic leader, and can be used to account for the genesis of most moral crusades and entire social movements. Further, it is very difficult to refute. A total refutation would not only have to indicate an alternative, but also demonstrate that the bureaucratic leader is not a "moral entrepreneur1'--is not a major factor in this transference of ideology. The purpose of this paper is to accomplish the former only--to provide another alternative based upon organizational research and theory which is equally if not more persuasive in explaining a moral crusade than Becker's individually based "moral entrepreneur" argument.
The difficulty in separating the two approaches is similar to the historian's dilemma of whether the historical incident makes the man great or the great man makes the historical incident.
Here the question becomes: does the moral crusader create the 2.
Fred J. G o k , The FBI Nobody Knows, New York: Macmillan, 1964. 3. Howard S. Becker, The Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963 (especially pp. 147-163) .
morally committed bureaucracy or is he a product of that bureau-4 cracy?
The difference between the moral entrepreneur approach and an approach which attributes the moral crusade primarily to a bureaucratic response to environmental fact.0rs.i~ that.in the latter instance, moral considerations are secondary to bureaucratic survival and growth, while in the former instance, moral considerations are primary. Further, the end results of either of these crusades may vary considerably since sach is in response to different stimuli. other conditions being equal, the bureaucratic crusade will continue only so long as bureaucratic considerations dict.ate while the moral crusade will continue so long as the individual moral crusader's zealotry requires.
In this paper, the work of the Bureau of Narcotics and its former commissioner, Harry J. Anslinger, are examined in light of Becker's conclusion that Anslinger was a moral entrepreneur who led his Bureau on a moral crusade against the use of marihuana, culminating in an Anslin.ger-hnstAgated publicity campaign that persuaded first the.general public and then Congress that, marihuana use was a vicious habit that.should be outlawed and severely penalized.4 Given the short time span Becker chose and his individualized focus, this seems to be a logical explanation of the Bureau's efforts. But given a broader organizational perspective, the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act and the Bureau's part in that passage appear to be only one phase of a larger
4,
Becker, op, cit., pp. 135-146, organizational process, environmental change. Using this focus it is necessary first to briefl~~examine the relationships between organizations and their environments with specia-l emphasis on adaptation and discuss a special case of these organizations, the public bureaucracy. The results of this analysis are then applied to the Narcotics Bureau and narcotics legislation in conjunction with an-examina,tion of Becker's findings. Finally, the implications of this analysis are examined.
ORGmIZATIONS AND ENVIRONMENTS
One on-going problem an organization must cope with is its relationship with its environment. F o r the incipient organization this means an initial decision as to the type of-relationship it desires, to establish with its environment., an assessment of the type of relationship it is able to establish, 'and the working-out of some acceptable-compromise between the two. For the established organization, this means maintaining this rela- Of course when the organization is in its incipient stages, the problems are magnified. Environmental support is more necessary, environmental hostility more of a threat to survival.
Usually the organization will adapt to the demands of the environ- 
c t i v i t i e s . The a t t i t u d e of t h e i r .environments w i l l have g r e a t b e a r i n g on t h i s d e c i s i o n , t o b e s u r e , b u t t h e f i n a l d e c i s i o n
rests w i t h t h e organ,j.zation. A f e d e r a l d e p a r t m e n t may go t h r o u g h any of t h e above s t a g e s , b u t f r e q u e n t l y , t h e f i n a l d e c is i o n d o e s n o t r e s t w i t h i n t h e d e p a r t m e n t , b u t w i t h t h e 'congress i o n a l , e x e c u t i v e o r j u d i c i a l body t h a t c r e a t e d i t . A bureau c r e a t e d by c o n g r e s s i o n a l enactment w i . 1 1 c o n t i n u e t o be u n a l t e r e d e x c e p t by i n t e r n a l d e c i s i o n o n l y a s l o n g a s Congress c a n b e convinced t h a t t h e r e i s no need t o a l t e r i t . Although t h e r e -m a y b e some q u e s t i o n of d e g r e e , t h e r e i s no q u e s t i o n t h a t p u b l i c o p i n i o n w i l l be a major f a c t o r i n t h e c o n g r e s s i o n a l d e c i s i o n .
i.
T h e r e f o r e , t h e f e d e r a l d e p a r t m e n t must convinde t h e p u b l i c and Congress:
1) t h a t i t s e r v e s a u s e f u l , o r i f p o s s i b l e , a n e c e s s a r y f u n c t i o n ; and 2 ) t h a t i t i s u n i q u e l y q u a l i f i e d t o do s o .
The l e s s t h e department i s s u r e o f i t s f u t u r e s t a t u s , t h e more i t w i l l t r y t o convince Congress and t h e p u b l i c o f t h e s e .

Background t o Environmental Change: The Emergence and
Development of t h e Bureau.
I n t h e l a t e n i n e t e e n t h and e a r l y t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r i e s , n a r -
c o t i c s were w i d e l y a v a i l a b l e , t h r o u g h d o c t o r s who i n d i s c r i m in a t e l y p r e s c r i b e d morphine and l a t e r h e r o i n a s p a i n k i l l e r s , t h r o u g h d r u g g i s t s who s o l d them o p e n l y , o r t h r o u g h a wide
v a r i e t y o f p a t e n t medicines. Narcotics u s e r s were p i t i e d r a t h e r t h a n l o a t h e d a s c r i m i n a i s o r d e g e n e r a t e s ,... 112
The p u b l i c ... ( i n t h e e a r l y t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y ) had an a l t o g e t h e r d i f f e r e n t c o n c e p t i o n of d r u g a d d i c t i o n from t h a t which p r e v a i l s t o d a y . The h a b i t was n o t approved, b u t n e i t h e r was i t r e
I n 1 9 1 4 , Congress t h r o u g h t h e p a s s a g e o f t h e Haxrison
Act a t t e m p t e d t o e x e r t sqme c o n t r o l o v e r t h e n a r c o t i c s t r a f f i c .
T h i s a c t r e m a i n s t o d a y t h e c o r n e r s t o n e o f n a r c o t i c s l e g i s l a -3 t i o n .
R a t h e r t h a n e l i m i n a t e t h e u s e o f n a r c o t i c d r u g s , t h e a c t
was p a s s e d i n o r d e r t o honor a . , p r e v i o u s i n t e r n a t i o n a l o b l i g a t i o n stemming from t h e Hague Convention o f 1912, and t o c o n t r o l t h e c r i m i n a l encroachments i n t o t h e d r u g t r a d e . Nowhere i n t h e a c t i s t h e r e d i r e c t r e f e r e n c e t o a d d i c t s o r a d d i c t i o n . I t s o s t e n s i b l e p u r p o s e a p p e a r e d t o b e s i m p l y t o make t h e e n t i r e p r o c e s s of d r u g d i s t r i b u t i o n w i t h i n t h e c o u n t r y a m a t t e r o f r e c o r d . T h e nominal e x c i s e t a x ( o n e c e n t p e r o u n c e ) , t h e r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t p e r s o n s and f i r m s h a n d l i n g d r u g s r e g i s t e r and pay f e e s , a l l seemed d e s i g n e d t o a c c o m p l i s h t h i s p u r p o s e . T h e r e i s no i n d i c a t i o n of a l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t i o n t o deny a d d i c t s a c c e s s t o l e g a l d r u g s o r t o i n t e r f e r e i n any way w i t h m e d i c a l p r a c t i c e s i n t h i s a r e a . 1 3 M e d i c a l p r a c t i c e s were s p e c i f i c a l l y exempted:
Nothing c o n t a i n e d i n t h i s s e c t i o n .,. s h a l l .,. a p p l y ... 1 n d i a n a U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1965, p. 4 . S e e a l s o Rufus King, "The N a r c o t i c s Bureau and t h e ~a r r i s o n Act: J a i l i n s t h e Healers and t h e S i c k , " 6 2 Yale Law J o u r n a l . 
( t ) o t h e d i s p e n s i n g o r d i s t r i b u t i o n o f any d r u g s m e n t i o n e d . . . t o a p a t i e n t by a p h y s i c i a n , d e n t i s t , o r v e t e r i n a r y s u r g e o n r e g i s t e r e d u n d e r s e c t i o n 4722 i n . t h e c o u r s e o f h i s
Thus, t h e a c t d i d n o t mske a d d i c t i o n i l l e g a l . A 1 1 it r e q u i r e d was t h a t a d d i c t s should o b t a i n d r u g s from r e g i s t e r e d
p h y s i c i a n s who made a r e c o r d o f t h e t r a n s a c t i o n .
A n a r c o t i c s d l v i s i o n was c r e a t e d i n t h e I n t e r n a l Revenue
Bureau of t h e T r e a s u r y Department t o c o l l e c t revenue and e n f o r c e t h e H a r r l s o n Act. I n 1 9 2 0 , i t merged i n t o t h e P r o h i b i t i o n Unit of t h a t d e p a r t m e n t , and upon i t s -c r e a t~o n i n 1927 i n t o t h e P r o h i b i t i o n Bureau, I n 1930, t h e Bureau o f N a r c o t i c s was formed a s a s e p a r a t e Bureau i n t h e T r e a s u r y Department, L e g i t i m a t i o n : The P r o c e s s o f Changing an Environment. 
A f t e r 1 9 1 4 , t h e powers of t h e N a r c o t i c s D i v i s i o n were c l e a rand l i m i t e d : t o e n f o r c e r e g i s t r a t i o n and r e c o r d -
c "~ a t t i t u d e toward ,drug use had n o t changed much w i t h t h e p a s s a g e o f t h e A c t --t h e r e w a s s o m e , o p p o s i t i o n t o d r u g u s e , .some s u p p o r t of i t , and a -g r e a t many who d i d n o t c a r e one way o r t h e o t h e r : I n f a c t t h e H a r r i s o n Act was
15 p a s s e d w i t h v e r y l i t t . l e , p u b l i c i t y o r news 'coverage. .
The ~e w
York T i m e s Index f o r 1 9 1 4 l i s t s o n l y two b r i e f a r t i c l e s on t h e f e d e r a l legislation, one i n J u n e and one i n August when t h e ' s e n a t e a d o p t e d t h e A c t . 1 t . s h o u l d be n o t e d t h a t t h e r e was a l s o discussion o f a broadened N e w York S t a t e n a r c o t i c s a c t and a r t i c l e s p u b l i c i z i n g t h e a r r e s t o f v i o l a t o r s of an e a r l i e r New York s t a t u t e a t t h a t t i m e .
Thus at this time, the Narcotics Division was faced with a severely restricted scope of operations. Acceptance of the legislation as envisioned by Congress would mean that the Division would at best continue as a marginal operation with limited enforcement duties. Given the normal, well-documented bureaucratic tendency toward growth and expansion, and given the fact that the Division was a public bureaucracy and needed to justify its operations and usefulness b e f~r e Congress, it would seem that increased power and jurisdiction in the area of drug control would be a desirable, and in fact, necessary goal.
Adaptation to the Harrison Act limitations would preclude attainment of this goal. Operating under a legislative mandate, the logical alternative to adaptation would be to persuade the Congress and public that expansion was necessary and to extend the provisions of the Harrison Act,.
Also at this point, the public's attitude toward narcotics use could be characterized as only slightly opposed. Faced with a situation where adaptation to the existing legislation was bureaucratically unfeasible, where expansion was desirable, and where environmental support--support by both Congress and the public--was necessary for continued existence, the Division launched a two-pronged campaign, one a barrage of reports and newspaper articles which generated a substantial public outcry against narcotics use, and the other a series of Divisionsponsored test cases in the courts which resulted in a reinter~retation of the Harrision Act and substantially broadened -14-powers for the Narcotics Division. l6 Thus the Division attained its goals by effecting an alteration of a weakly-held public value on-narcotics use from neutrality or-.slight opposition to strong opposition, and by persuading the courts that it should have increased powers. .17
Though the resources of the Division were limited,-it was able to accomplish its.goals because it was a public bureaucracy, and as such had the aforementioned advantages which arise from that status. Since the ability to develop propaganda and the means to communicate it were inherent in this status, as was the propensity by the public to accept this propaganda, environmental support could be generated with less resource expenditure.
Further, the Division as a public bureaucracy would be.assumed to ,have a familiarity with governmental. processes not only in.its own executive branch,.but also in the congressional and judicial. branches as well. This built-in expertise, necessary for the Division's expansion, might.be quite costly in time and resources for,the private bureaucracy but again was inherent in the Division's status. 
I t i s an i n t e r e s t i n g combination o f t r u t h , s p e c u l a t i o n and f i c t i o n , a mix which t h e D i v i s i o n and t h e Bureau which succeeded i t found t o b e an e f f e c t i v e p u b l i c p e r s u a d e r f o r many y e a r s . I n a r e p o r t d a t e d J u n e , 1919, a committee a p p o i n t e d by t h e T r e a s u r y Department t o s t u d y n a r c o t i c s r e p o r t e d i n t e r a l i a t h a t t h e r e were 237,665 a d d i c t s i n t h e United S t a t e s t r e a t e d by p h y s i c i a n s ( b a s e d upon a t h i r t y p e r c e n t r e s p o n s e by p h y s i c i a n s q u e r i e d ) , t h a t t h e r e w e r e o v e r one m i l l i o n a d d i c t s i n t h e c o u n t r y i n 1919 ( a f i g u r e based upon a compromise between p r o j e c t i o n s based on t h e p e r c e n t a g e o f a d d i c t s i n J a c k s o n v i l l e , F l o r i d a i n 1913 and New
York C i t y i n 1 9 1 8 ) , t h a t t h e r e was e x t e n s i v e a d d i c t i o n among c h i l d r e n , t h a t n a r c o t i c s were h a r m f u l t o h e a l t h and m o r a l s , and t h a t t h e y were d i r e c t l y c o n n e c t e d w i t h c r i m e and a b j e c t p o v e r t y .
Among t h e p h y s i c a l e f f e c t s n o t e d w e r e s t e r i l i t y , d i s e a s e d l u n g s , h e a r t s and k i d n e y s , r o t t i n g o f t h e s k i n and i n s a n i t y . 18
The " s c h o l a r l y r e p o r t " i s a n i n t e r e s t
i n g example o f t h e propaganda e f f o r t , f o r i t a p p e a r s t o t h e c a s u a l r e a d e r t o b e c r e d i b l e ( e s p e c i a l l y g i v e n i t s s o u r c e ) , and c o n t a i n s c h a r g e s which seem t o be d e s i g n e d t o g e n e r a t e widespread p u b l i c d i sg u s t toward n a r c o t i c s u s e r s and s u p p o r t f o r t h e D i v i s i o n and i t s e f f o r t s . Many o f t h e same c h a r g e s were a p p l i e d t o marihuana when t h e Bureau campaigned a g a i n s t i t s u s e .
While the Division was carrying out its public campaign, it was also busy in the courts. The enactment under consideration ... says nothing of "addicts" and does not undertake to prescribe methods for their medical treatment, and we cannot possibly conclude that a physician acted improperly or unwisely or for other than medical purposes solely because he has dispensed to one of them, in the ordinary course and in good faith, four small tablets of morphine or cocaine for relief of condition incident to addiction. 23
The court went on to warn the,Division:
Federal power is delegated, and its prescribed limits must not be transcended even though the ends seem desirable. The unfortunate condition of the recipient certainly created no reasonable probability that she would sell or otherwise dispose of the few tablets entrusted to her and we cannot say that by so dispensing them the doctor necessarily transcended the limits of that professional conduct with which Congress never intended to interfere. Along with the works of Lindesmith and King, supra, see the Bureau of Narcotics publication, Comments on Narcotic Drugs (undated), the Bureau's reply to the A.B.A.-A.M.A. committee interim report "Narcotic Drugs". This publication, which was described by DeMott as "perhaps the crudest publication yet produced by a government agency" (Benjamin DeMott, .-"The Great Narcotics Muddle, " Harpers ~a~a z i n e , .
March, 1962, p. 53), was later taken out of print. For a vivid account-of the Bureau's methods with its critics, see Lindesmith, The Addict ..., op. cit., pp. 2 4 2 -2 6 8 . .
30. 1t.seems .clear from examining periodicals, newspapers and the Congressional Record that the Bureau'was primarily responsible for the passage of the ac.t, though Becker's almost exclusive reliance on the claims of the Bureau in its official publication Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs does not seem warranted given the previously discussed tendency of a.public bureaucracy to emphasize.its necessity and successful functioning.
theme runs consistently through his writings. 31 What Becker ignores is that Anslinger was also a bureaucrat, .and thus responsive to'bureaucratic pressures and demands as well. The distinction between these roles is difficult to make, but it is fundamenta1,in analyzing the legislation.
To understand whether the marihuana legislation was to a large degree the result of.bureaucratic.processes similar to the with practically no debate3* and signed into law on August 2, 1937. While Becker seems to argue that the Bureau generated a great public outcry against marihuana use prior to the passage of the Act, his data supporting this argument are misleading if not erroneously interpreted. 3 3 While marihuana use seems to 32. This is not unusual in the area of moral legislation, as Becker points out. Furthermore, unlike non-criminal legislation where the losing party still has a variety of remedies available to challenge the law, few remedies are available to those who are legislated against in criminal areas. Legitimate lobbies cannot be formed, and test cases are dangerous.
However, Becker gives the impression that the only opposition to the marihuana legislation came from hemp growers, and that no one argued for the marihuana users (Outsiders, . This is erroneous, The legislative counsel for the A.M.A., Dr. William C. Woodward, challenged the Bureau's conclusions that marihuana use was harmful to health and widespread among children, and demanded evidence to support these assertions. While he was not representing the marihuana users, he was certainly arguing their case and questioning the need for the legislation. See Taxation of Marihuana (Hearings Before the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives, 75th Congress, 1st Session, on H.R. 6385, April 27-30 and May 4, 1937, especially p. 92). It should be noted that this opposition was ignored by the committee members.
33. Becker's data consist of a survey of the Readers Guide to Periodical Literature, in which he found that no magazine articles appeared before July, 1935; four appeared between July, 1935 and June, 1937; and seventeen between July, 1937 and June, 1939 (Outsiders, p. 141) . While this is correct, the four articles in the second period all appeared before 1937, no articles appeared in the five months preceding the House Ways and Means Committee hearings on the act, in late April and early May, one appeared in July, 1937 and the rest appeared after the bill was signed into law on August 2, 1937. In short, of the articles which Becker asserts provided the impetus to Congressional action, only one appeared in the seven months of 1937 before the marihuana bill was signed into law, to have increased since the early 1930's; there appears to have been little public concern expressed in the news media,'even in 1937. Few magazine articles were written about the subject, and if the New York-Times is any indication, newspaper coverage was also slight., 34 The final presidential signing of the ac,t.
/'
received minimal coverage from the Times, 35 In short, rather than the,Bureau-generated public turmoil that Becker indicates, it seems that,public awareness of the problem, as well as public opposition to it, was slight.
While it cannot.be shown conclusively that the Marihuana Tax Act was the result of a bureaucratic response to environmental conditions, similarities between this period and the postHarrison Act period are evident. Marihuana opposition, like narcotics opposi,tion before, appears to have been a weakly held value. In both, situations, publicity campaigns were launched.
In both cases,'one through the courts and one through Congress., efforts were exerted to expand the power of the Bureau. In both 34. ; A survey of the New York Times Index shows:. one ar,ticle discussed marihuana in 1936 and eight discussed the subject in 1937 up to August third. There were no articles about or coverage of any of the Congressional hearings. Contrary-to Becker's assertion, perhaps the most significant thing about this period was the lack of publicity involved.
35. .The total coverage -by the New York Times consisted 0f.a four li.ne AP dispatch near the bottom of-.page four, titled "Signs Bill to Curb Marihuana" and.reading in its entirety: "President Roosevelt.signed today a bill to curb traffic in the narcotic, marihuana, through heavy taxes ' on transactions. " (August 3, 1937) .
cases.there were substantial numbers of potential criminals which could be incorporated into the Bureau's jurisdiction.
Perhaps more convincing,than .similarities are the.budgetary appropriations for the Bureau from 1915 Bureau from -to 1944 in Table I . For easier comparison, these data for a twenty year period from 1920 when the Narcotics Division became part of the Prohibition Division of the Treasury Department to 1939 are presented in Figure I . In 1932, when .the Bureau's appropriations were approaching an all time high, the Bureau stated:
The present constitutional limitations would seem to require control measures directed against the intrastate traffic of Indian hemp (marihuana). to be adopted by the several State governments rather than by the Federal Government, and the policy has been to urge the State authorities generally to provide the necessary legislation, with supporting enforcement activity, to prohi.bit the traffic except for bona fide medical purposes. The proposed uniform State narcotic law,..with optional text applying to restriction of traffic in Indian hemp, has been recommended as an adequate law,to accomplish the desired purpose. 36
At that time, according to the Bureau, sixteen states had enacted legislation in which "the sale of possession (of marihuana) is prohibited except for medical purposes.
11 37 BY
1936, it appears that the Bureau" policy had succeeded, for, .
as Table I1 shows, all forty eight states had enacted legislation which governed the sale of possession of marihuana. ,.~ecember-18, 1933, . pp. 178-198; for fiscal 1936 : 74th Congress, First Session, December 17, .1934 
Thus in the hearing for the 1935 appropriation:
Mr. Arnold: "How are you getting by with that $1,000,000 after those deductions?" Comm, Anslinger: "I am getting by, but 1 have had to cut back enforcement activities so sharply that it has reached a point where I think it has been harmful,,." (1935 Hearings, op. cit., p. 189) In his opening statement at the hearing for the 1936 appropriation, AnsLinger stated: "Mr, Chairman, and distinguished members of the committee, during the past fiscal year we have been operating under a very restricted appropriation. Our enforcement did not fall off too much although it did suffer somewhat." (1936 Hearings, op, cit., p. 201 Again, in 1937, Anslinger-the moralist would be expected to first.convince the general public that marihuana use was evil and immoral, while Anslinger the bureaucrat wou.ld be more concerned with attaining passage of legislation which would increase the Bureau's powers and then proceed to generate environmental support for these-powers. In fact, the latter occurred. The great bulk of bureau-inspired publicity came after the passage of the act, not before.
3
Faced with a steadily decreasing budget, the Bureau responded as any organization so threatened might react: it tried to appear more necessary, and it tried to increase its scope of-operations; While Commissioner Anslinger as leader of this bureaucratic response might be characterized as a "bureaucratic entrepreneur", such characterization would be mislead.ing, for similar to Becker's characterization it still simplifies the problem by emphasizing the individual's.importance and disregarding that of the bureau and its environment. Comm. ~n s l i n~e r : We took on the administration of the marihuana law and did not get any increase for that purpose. The way we are running we may have to request a deficiency of $100,000 at the end of the year; but I sincerely hope you will not see me here for a deficit. Beginning the first of the year, Mr. Chairman, I shall control all travel out of Washington. That is a hard job. I have to do that to make up some of this money.
9
We went ahead at high speed and broke up ten big distributing rings, and now we find ourselves in the hole financially. was a period of small advances and then a gradual decline. 47
Of course the major factor in that period was the massive redirection of funds from non-military areas, and thus these figures do not accurately reflect the Bureau's enterprise.
As was pointed.-out at the beginning, this paperdoes .not presume-to totally refute Becker's conclus~ons, but ,rather.to demonstrate that-an alternative explanation..is equally if not more persuasive. The usefulness of this,organizational approach lies in that it can be extended to other similar moral crusades or to entire social movements, where the emphasis so far has been on the, work of certain individual crusaders rather than on the organizations themselves. Viewed in this way, whole new ranges of variables become evident, and hopefully researchers will be able to contribute to as well as draw upon current organizational knowledge.
.
47:
See Table I , p. 24.
